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HB 2873

STALKING-HARASSMENT

104th Regular Session Introduced by Jaime Andrade and 26 co-sponsors

Expands stalking No Contact Order Act to include electronic tracking/communications, broadens definitions of stalking and emotional distress, and lets employers, schools, and worsh

Public Act . . . . . . . . . 104-0251
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Bill Summary · HB 2873

HB 2873 — Stalking No Contact Order Act (Public Act 104-0251)

Status: Enacted (Public Act 104-0251)
Sponsor: Rep. Jennifer Gong-Gershowitz (chief Senate sponsor: Sen. Laura Fine)
Statute amended: 740 ILCS 21/10 (Stalking No Contact Order Act)
Governor approved / Effective date: August 15, 2025

Purpose

To broaden and clarify the statutory definitions in the Stalking No Contact Order Act—most notably the definitions of “stalking,” “course of conduct,” “emotional distress,” and “contact”—and to create a rebuttable presumption that certain types of conduct cause emotional distress. The amendments update the statutory language to expressly include electronic tracking and communications and to allow employers/schools/places of worship to act as petitioners through authorized agents.

Key provisions / changes

  • Expands “course of conduct” to mean two or more acts, including actions taken directly, indirectly, or through third parties; explicitly includes:
    • following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, threatening,
    • interfering with or damaging property or pets,
    • use of electronic tracking systems or acquiring tracking information to determine a targeted person’s location, movement, or travel patterns,
    • electronic communications.
    • Clarifies that incarceration of the respondent is not a bar to prosecution.
  • Defines “emotional distress” as significant mental suffering, anxiety, or alarm.
    • Creates a rebuttable presumption (rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence) that the following conduct presumptively causes emotional distress:
    • Creating a disturbance at the petitioner’s place of employment or school;
    • Repeatedly telephoning the petitioner’s workplace, home, or residence after being told to stop;
    • Repeatedly following the petitioner in public places;
    • Repeatedly keeping the petitioner under surveillance (e.g., remaining outside home, school, workplace, vehicle, or peering into windows);
    • Threatening the safety of the petitioner’s minor child or family member;
    • Threatening physical force, confinement, or restraint on one or more occasions.
  • Expands “contact” to include nonconsensual or unwanted physical presence, appearing within sight of the victim, approaching/confronting in public or private, appearing at workplace/residence, entering/remaining on property, placing/delivering objects to property, and electronic communications (as defined in the Criminal Code).
  • Defines “petitioner” to include a named victim or an authorized agent of an employer, school, or place of worship (i.e., entities may file on behalf of the victim).
  • Clarifies the “reasonable person” standard as a person in the petitioner’s circumstances with the petitioner’s knowledge of the respondent and the respondent’s prior acts.
  • Broadens the definition of “stalking” to explicitly include harassment defined as conduct that:
    • is not necessary to accomplish a reasonable purpose under the circumstances,
    • would cause a reasonable person emotional distress, and
    • actually causes emotional distress to the petitioner.
  • Preserves exclusions: lawful exercise of free speech/assembly and specified lawful labor-related activities (e.g., lawful picketing and monitoring labor compliance).

Who is affected

  • Victims and petitioners (including authorized agents for employers, schools, and places of worship) — broader protections and clearer grounds to seek stalking no contact orders.
  • Respondents/defendants — expanded definitions may increase the range of conduct that can support non-contact orders or civil actions.
  • Courts and law enforcement — will apply the expanded definitions, rebuttable presumption standards, and electronic-tracking provisions.
  • Employers, schools, and places of worship — may act as petitioners through authorized agents and are treated as potential protected locations (workplace/school/place of worship).

Procedural / timeline notes

  • Passed both chambers of the Illinois General Assembly; sent to the Governor June 20, 2025.
  • Governor approved August 15, 2025; law effective August 15, 2025.
  • Enacted as Public Act 104-0251.

Practical implications / considerations

  • The statutory rebuttable presumption creates clearer categories of conduct likely to meet the emotional-distress element, but defendants can rebut by presenting evidence to the contrary (preponderance standard).
  • Inclusion of electronic tracking and communications recognizes modern stalking methods and may increase evidence types admissible or considered in petitions.
  • Allowing authorized agents to file broadens institutional ability to seek orders on behalf of victims (e.g., schools or employers).
  • Courts will need to apply the modified “reasonable person” standard while considering the petitioner’s particular circumstances and knowledge of the respondent.

If you’d like, I can extract the exact amended statutory text for 740 ILCS 21/10, prepare a side‑by‑side comparison to prior law, or summarize likely litigation questions that may arise under the new language.

Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.

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