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SR 133

Respectfully urges Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to reject results of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.'s 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction and require rebid.

2024-2025 Regular Session Introduced by Linda Greenstein and 3 co-sponsors

Urges FERC to reject PJM's 2025/26 BRA results and rebid, citing market flaws; if accepted, NJ ratepayers could see lower capacity charges and avert a 17–20% bill rise.

Filed with Secretary of State
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Bill Summary · SR 133

Summary — SR 133

Title: Respectfully urges Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to reject results of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.'s 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction and require rebid
Classification: Senate Resolution (non‑binding)
Introduced: February 21, 2025 — Filed with Secretary of State; reported by Senate Economic Growth Committee with amendments June 12, 2025. Sponsors: multiple (primary sponsor listed as Senator Brian P. Stack in committee report). Copies to be sent to FERC Chair and Commissioners.

Purpose and intent

SR 133 respectfully urges the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to reject the results of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (PJM) 2025/2026 Reliability Pricing Model Base Residual Auction (BRA) and require PJM to rebid the auction. The resolution frames the rebid request as necessary to address alleged flaws in the PJM capacity market construct that produced an unprecedented price spike and may have left the auction susceptible to manipulation.

Background / Findings cited

  • PJM administers a regional capacity market (the Reliability Pricing Model) that secures capacity for future delivery years; the BRA determines the capacity clearing price used across PJM states.
  • The July 2024 BRA for the 2025/2026 delivery year produced a clearing price nearly 10 times higher than the prior auction.
  • The Organization of PJM States, Inc. (OPSI) and PJM’s Independent Market Monitor (IMM) identified flaws in the capacity market construct and expressed concern that artificial scarcity and other issues may have contributed to the spike.
  • Most New Jersey customers obtain supply via the Basic Generation Service (BGS) auction; BRA capacity prices are passed through to BGS and thus to ratepayers. The resolution cites a projected increase in average monthly electric bills in New Jersey of approximately 17–20% beginning June 2025.

Key provisions (what the resolution does)

  • Formally urges FERC to:
    • Reject the results of PJM’s 2025/2026 BRA; and
    • Require PJM to rebid the auction.
  • Directs that copies of the resolution be transmitted to the Chairman and Commissioners of FERC.

Who is affected

  • New Jersey ratepayers (residential, small commercial, industrial) through BGS pass‑through of capacity costs.
  • New Jersey’s electric public utilities that procure power via BGS.
  • PJM market participants and capacity sellers/buyers across the PJM footprint.
  • FERC (as the federal regulator with jurisdiction over PJM).
  • State regulators (e.g., New Jersey Board of Public Utilities) and OPSI are stakeholders but lack authority to compel a rebid.

Procedural / timeline notes

  • The resolution is non‑binding and cannot compel FERC to act; it is a formal expression of the State Senate’s position sent to FERC for consideration.
  • Key dates cited in the text: July 2024 (BRA held); projected bill increases starting June 2025. Legislative steps: introduced Feb 21, 2025; reported with committee amendments June 12, 2025; enrolled and filed with Secretary of State in late May–June 2025.

Potential impact

  • If FERC were to reject the BRA results and order a rebid, capacity clearing prices could be reset in a way that lowers the capacity charge component passed through to New Jersey ratepayers; the resolution asserts this would mitigate the projected 17–20% bill increase.
  • If FERC declines to act, the resolution highlights continued higher costs for consumers and ongoing concerns about market design and potential manipulation.

Limitation

  • As a state legislative resolution, SR 133 expresses policy preference but does not alter federal jurisdiction or directly change PJM market outcomes; ultimate authority rests with FERC and PJM market rules.

Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.

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