Bill
SB 1177
Wisconsin SB 1177 would require risk-limiting audits for elections starting in 2027 and replace the excess-ballot removal with a documented, integrated RLA framework.
Title: Relating to performing risk-limiting audits and eliminating the process for removing excess ballots from the vote count.
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Introduction and Sponsor
- Introduced in the 2025-2026 Legislature as Senate Bill 1177 (SENATE) and cosponsored by Representative Krug.
- Proposed by Senator Wimberger; referred to the Committee on Government Operations, Labor and Economic Development.
- Status note in the provided materials indicates the bill failed to pass (pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 1) as of March 23, 2026.
Purpose
- The bill has two main aims:
1) Establish and require risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for elections, starting with elections held after January 1, 2027.
2) Eliminate the existing process for removing an excess number of ballots from the vote count (the “excess ballots” procedure) and replace it with an approach that further documents and incorporates excess-ballot discrepancies into the RLA framework.
Section-by-section overview of substantive changes
1) Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) (Sections 16; new statutory framework)
- What RLAs are: An audit protocol that uses statistical methods to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect election outcome. Involves manual counting of ballots from one or more audit units, with sampling and potential escalation to full hand counts.
- Implementation timeline:
- County clerks must begin RLAs for elections held after January 1, 2027.
- Definitions introduced (new §7.58):
- Audit unit: Ward, election district, reporting unit, batch, scanner feed, or other unit of vote aggregation.
- Batch-level comparison: A type of RLA where reported unit counts are compared to manual counts, discrepancies inform subsequent sampling, and the audit continues until the risk limit is met or a full manual count is performed.
- Cast vote record (CVR): Machine-readable ballot-level data for auditing, excluding identifying information about electors.
- Selected contest: A statewide contest with the most votes, plus at least one additional randomly selected statewide contest (chosen by the Elections Commission) after election day.
- Risk limit and risk-limiting audit: Statistical concepts for controlling the probability of not detecting an incorrect outcome.
- Procedures and public transparency (Sections 16(3), (4), (5), (7), (8)):
- Counties must provide 48 hours’ notice of audit details; upload data to the Elections Commission and publicly post materials.
- Before audits, counties must publish unofficial tabulated results per audit unit.
- All ballot types must be included in RLAs (in person, absentee, provisional).
- Maintain chain-of-custody; ensure public access to audit processes consistent with law.
- Complete the RLA before certifying election results; if a selected contest results in a full manual tally, the manual tally replaces electronic counts for official results.
- Audit teams and governance (Section 16(4)):
- Audit teams appointed by county boards of canvassers must include a balance of members affiliated with the two major political parties (and possibly unaffiliated electors).
- Members must be qualified electors; no candidates for the contested office.
- Commission duties and procedures (Section 16(5)):
- The Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) provides guidance, randomly selects the selected contests (with expedited rules for presidential contests), publishes randomness inputs and data formats, and coordinates timing to avoid duplication with system audits.
- Expedited audit option (Section 16(6)):
- For presidential contests with close margins or recounts, the Commission may authorize expedited RLAs using alternative methods while preserving the risk limit; procedures to be published no later than 120 days before a presidential election.
- Audit results and transparency (Section 16(7), (8)):
- If RLAs yield a full manual tally, that tally governs official results.
- Public posting of tallies, worksheets, reconciliation results, and chain-of-custody logs within 24 hours after each stage.
- WEC maintains a dedicated webpage detailing deadlines, sample lists, statuses, and final reports.
- Technical transition and coordination (Section 16(9), (10)):
- A Working Group with election officials and experts will design and evaluate RLAs.
- Transitional templates and data formats to be published by July 1, 2026.
- Counties inventory capabilities needed for statewide implementation.
2) Removing the excess-ballot removal process (Sections 4, 6, 10-12; renumberings)
- Current law (7.51(2)(e); 7.52(4)(e)) allows election inspectors to remove an excess number of ballots from the vote count by drawing from a ballot box, marking them as removed due to excess ballots, and setting them aside (not counted in totals).
- Provisions in SB 1177 repeal this existing removal-by-drawing process and replace it with a structured approach that is integrated into risk-limiting audits.
- New approach begins phased rollout:
- January 1, 2026: Start applying the new process to selected contests not yet covered by RLAs, with documentation of discrepancies in the original canvass, and integration into risk-limiting audit procedures.
- April 1, 2027: Extend the new process to all elections.
- New documentation and verification requirements:
- Any discrepancy in excess ballots must be documented in detail (number and type) on the original canvass.
- Discrepancies are factored into the risk-limiting audit procedures (s. 7.58).
- If the discrepancy exceeds 0.5% of total ballots cast in the audit unit, the Elections Commission must investigate.
- Reconciliation procedures must preserve all legally cast ballots and maintain election integrity.
- Cleanup of related repeals and renumberings:
- Repeals of specific subsections of 7.51 and 7.52 related to excess-ballot removal.
- Renumbering adjustments to sections previously created or amended by this act, aligning with the new framework.
Other notable items
- Oath and deputy voting rules (Section 1): A revised oath for deputies under absentee voting duties emphasizing commitment to fair implementation and the possibility that errors can invalidate votes.
- Effective dates:
- The general implementation of risk-limiting audits begins January 1, 2027 (with expedited and transitional provisions earlier for coordination).
- Repeals and renumberings related to excess-ballot removal take effect April 1, 2027, while other related amendments become effective upon publication.
Potential Impact
- Election integrity: RLAs are designed to increase confidence in election outcomes by statistically ensuring that reported results reflect the actual ballots cast.
- Transparency and public trust: Expanded public access and documentation for audits.
- Administrative workload: RLAs and the new reconciliation requirements will increase county clerks’ workloads and require new processes, data systems, and staff training.
- Budget and resources: Transitional requirements and software/data needs may affect county budgets; state-level implementation guidance and templates are to be provided by the Commission.
Important caveat
- The bill text shows procedural and phased timelines with phased rollouts, extensive definitions, and a robust framework for RLAs. The status indicates it did not pass in the session documented here. Readers should verify the bill’s current status and any amendments in subsequent legislative actions.
Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.
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