Bill
HR 252
Blocks owners/operators of port facilities with security plans from contracting with state-owned firms from China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran, or any entity owned by them.
Note on source documents
- The materials you provided contain multiple, conflicting texts all labeled “H.R. 252” (a federal bill and several state resolutions). Because the most detailed legislative record and committee report included is for the federal H.R. 252 — titled the “Secure Our Ports Act of 2025” — the summary below focuses on that measure.
- If you intended a different H.R. 252 (for example, a Louisiana resolution directing the State Law Institute to study reversionary trusts), please confirm and I will prepare a focused summary of that specific measure.
Summary — Secure Our Ports Act of 2025 (H.R. 252, as reported H. Rept. 119‑148)
Purpose and intent
- To strengthen U.S. maritime and port security by preventing certain foreign state-owned enterprises from owning, leasing, or operating port facilities that are required to maintain a facility security plan under federal law.
Key provisions
- Adds a new section (proposed 46 U.S.C. §70015) to Subchapter II of chapter 700, Title 46, U.S. Code:
- Prohibits an owner or operator of a facility (for which a facility security plan is required under 46 U.S.C. §70103(c)) from entering into contracts for ownership, leasing, or operation of the facility with:
1. Chinese, Russian, North Korean, or Iranian state-owned enterprises; or
2. Foreign entities for which any percentage is owned by an entity of those countries.
- Adopts the definitions of “facility” and “owner or operator” from 46 U.S.C. §70101.
Who/what is affected
- Directly affected: owners and operators of port facilities subject to facility security plans (those the Secretary of Homeland Security believes could be involved in a transportation security incident), and entities seeking to contract to own/lease/operate such facilities.
- Indirectly affected: port terminal operators, maritime service providers, foreign investors with ties to the listed countries, and U.S. supply chains relying on affected port operations.
- Exclusions: facilities owned or operated by the Department of Defense are excluded from the facility-security-plan requirement referenced.
Procedural status and timeline (from provided record)
- Introduced in the House: January 9, 2025 (Rep. Ken Calvert).
- Referred to House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee; Subcommittee on Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation.
- Committee ordered reported with amendment: April 2, 2025 (voice vote).
- Committee report filed: H. Rept. 119‑148 (June 6, 2025).
- House passage: June 9, 2025 — passed under suspension of the rules (voice vote).
- Received in the Senate and read twice: June 10, 2025; referred to Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Potential impacts and considerations
- National security: Aims to reduce risk of foreign state influence or control over critical maritime infrastructure.
- Commercial/investment: Could limit or block investments or management agreements by entities with ownership links to the listed countries; may require restructuring of existing or planned relationships.
- Implementation questions: Enforcement mechanisms, treatment of existing contracts, and any waiver or transition provisions are not detailed in the summary text; agencies (Coast Guard/DHS) would likely be responsible for interpretation and enforcement under the referenced facility-security-plan regime.
- Legal and trade considerations: May raise contractual, foreign-investment review, or international-trade policy considerations depending on scope and how “ownership” is assessed.
If you want
- A concise one‑page brief for non‑expert audiences.
- A focused summary of a different H.R. 252 (for example, the Louisiana study of reversionary trusts) — please confirm which bill/version you want summarized.
Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.
Sign in to ask a question.
