An Act updating the Commonwealth's wiretap statutes
Updates MA wiretap law to require strict judicial oversight, bar private secret surveillance, and expand designated offenses for court‑authorized electronic surveillance.
Updates MA wiretap law to require strict judicial oversight, bar private secret surveillance, and expand designated offenses for court‑authorized electronic surveillance.
Note: the legislative file provided includes multiple unrelated documents both titled “S 1204.” This summary focuses on the Massachusetts bill titled “An Act updating the Commonwealth’s wiretap statutes” (filed by Senator Michael O. Moore). A separate Idaho S 1204 in the packet is an appropriation bill and is not summarized here.
Summary — An Act updating the Commonwealth’s wiretap statutes (S.1204 — MA)
Purpose
- Modernize and clarify Massachusetts’ wiretap/electronic surveillance statute (G.L. c. 272, §99) to reflect contemporary electronic surveillance technologies, limit secret private surveillance, and define the scope of law enforcement authority to conduct court‑authorized electronic surveillance by enumerating “designated offenses.”
Key provisions
- Amend preamble and paragraph A of G.L. c. 272, §99 to:
- Acknowledge that modern electronic surveillance can be necessary for investigating certain crimes beyond traditional organized‑crime investigations.
- Prohibit the secret use of modern electronic surveillance devices by private individuals.
- Require that law enforcement use of such devices occur only under “strict judicial supervision” and be limited to investigations of “designated offenses.”
- Revise paragraph B, clause 7 to expand and specify the definition of “designated offense.” The updated list:
- Retains many existing organized‑crime related offenses (weapons offenses, arson, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, bribery, felony burglary, money laundering, enterprise crime, extortion, forgery, certain gaming offenses, kidnapping, felony larceny, lending crimes, perjury, felony prostitution offenses, robbery, subornation of perjury, violations of specified statutes, accessories, attempts/conspiracies).
- Explicitly adds several offenses whether or not connected to organized crime, including: human trafficking (G.L. c. 265 §§50–53), illegal trafficking in weapons, illegal use/possession of explosives or chemical, radiological, or biological weapons, and civil rights violations causing bodily injury (plus accessories, attempts, conspiracies).
- Emphasis on judicial oversight: surveillance must be conducted under judicial authorization and supervision (the bill does not, in the text provided, change warrant or probable‑cause standards but limits categories of offenses and prohibits private secret surveillance).
Who is affected
- Law enforcement agencies: clarifies and expands the category of crimes for which court‑authorized electronic surveillance may be sought.
- Courts and judges: will continue/expand role in authorizing and supervising electronic surveillance applications.
- Private individuals and private investigators: explicitly barred from secret use of modern electronic surveillance devices.
- Persons suspected/accused of the enumerated “designated offenses”: subject to a broader statutory basis for law enforcement electronic surveillance in investigations.
Procedural status & timeline
- Filed in the Senate by Sen. Michael O. Moore; referred to the Judiciary Committee.
- Docketed as Senate No. 1204; related to earlier similar matter (Senate No. 1075, 2023–2024).
- Hearing scheduled for 09/09/2025, 1:00 PM–5:00 PM (location A-2; virtual option noted in docket).
- Subsequent action or final enactment not reflected in the materials provided.
Notes and context
- The bill focuses on limiting private secret surveillance and setting statutory boundaries for law enforcement electronic surveillance via an updated list of qualifying offenses. It does not, in the text excerpt provided, expressly revise warrant standards (e.g., probable cause or minimization requirements), but the expanded list of “designated offenses” could broaden instances in which judicially‑authorized interception is available.
- Stakeholders likely to review impacts include privacy advocates, civil‑rights organizations, law‑enforcement agencies, and the judiciary.
Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.
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