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S 1284

Requires instruction concerning traffic stops in pre-licensing courses

2025 Regular Session Introduced by Leroy Comrie and 5 co-sponsors

Expands MA wiretap rules: allows limited, judge-supervised electronic surveillance for designated offenses (incl. first-degree murder) when ordinary methods fail or seem unlikely.

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Bill Summary · S 1284

Summary — S.1284 (Commonwealth of Massachusetts)

Title in file: "An Act relative to the interception of wire and oral communications"
Primary sponsor: Sen. John C. Velis (Hampden & Hampshire)

Note: the metadata provided includes an inconsistent title ("Requires instruction concerning traffic stops in pre‑licensing courses") and a long list of sponsors that appears to include federal legislators. The bill text and docket identify this as a Massachusetts state bill presented by Sen. John C. Velis amending chapter 272, section 99 (wiretap/electronic surveillance law). Please verify official legislative records for final sponsor/co‑sponsor lists and bill title.

Purpose / Intent

To clarify and adjust the legal framework governing judicially‑authorized electronic surveillance (wiretaps) in Massachusetts by:
- Explicitly permitting, in limited circumstances, electronic surveillance for certain non‑organized‑crime offenses (where normal investigative methods fail or are unlikely to succeed), and
- Revising and restating the definition and scope of "designated offenses" for which such surveillance may be authorized.

Key provisions

  • Amends chapter 272, section 99 (subsections A and B).
  • Adds a new paragraph stating that law enforcement may use modern electronic surveillance under strict judicial supervision when investigating specified crimes not associated with organized crime, after a showing that normal investigative procedures have been tried and failed or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed.
  • Strengthens/clarifies the requirement that use of electronic surveillance:
    • Must be conducted under strict judicial supervision; and
    • Must be limited to investigation of “designated offenses” (as defined in subsection B, paragraph 7).
  • Rewrites the definition of “designated offense” to:
    • List a set of offenses in connection with organized crime (e.g., arson; weapons offenses including illegal possession/use of firearms and certain defined weapons; assault and battery with a dangerous weapon; extortion; bribery; burglary; embezzlement; forgery; gambling offenses; intimidation of a witness/juror; kidnapping; larceny; loan‑sharking; money laundering; mayhem; murder; narcotics offenses; perjury; prostitution; robbery; subornation of perjury; accessory, conspiracy, attempt, solicitation to commit the foregoing), and
    • Explicitly add murder in the first degree as a designated offense even when not connected to organized crime.

Who is affected

  • Law enforcement agencies seeking electronic surveillance warrants (expanded grounds in narrow circumstances).
  • Judicial officers who review and authorize wiretap applications (continued/explicit judicial oversight).
  • Individuals subject to investigations (potential increase in circumstances where surveillance can be authorized).
  • Civil liberties advocates and privacy stakeholders (changes may raise concerns about surveillance scope).

Procedural / timeline notes (from provided docket)

  • Filed / introduced: Jan 17, 2025 (text shows Senate Docket No. 2324).
  • Referred to Judiciary (02/27/2025); passed the Senate (02/26/2025); delivered to the House/Assembly afterward.
  • Additional referrals and calendar actions are recorded (including to Transportation and Commerce committees in some entries) and hearings were scheduled for Sept. 9, 2025 (per docket entries). The record contains duplicated and possibly conflicting committee referral entries — consult the official legislative website for current status.

Potential impacts and considerations

  • Narrow expansion: the bill permits wiretap use beyond organized‑crime investigations in limited (specified) cases — notably first‑degree murder — where non‑electronic methods have failed or likely will fail.
  • Judicial oversight requirement remains explicit, which may limit misuse; nonetheless, civil liberties groups may raise concerns about widening surveillance authorizations.
  • Operationally, investigators could obtain electronic surveillance tools earlier in complex homicide investigations when other methods are ineffective.

For authoritative details (final text, amendments, votes, and sponsor/co‑sponsor lists), consult the official Massachusetts Legislature bill page for S.1284.

Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.

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