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HJR 11

Proposing an amendment to the Oregon Constitution relating to initiative measures.

2025 Regular Session Introduced by Ed Diehl and 8 co-sponsors

HJR11 would replace the Anti-Donation Clause to let public funds go to private entities for a defined 'public purpose,' but only after enabling legislation and voter approval.

In committee upon adjournment.
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WeVote Research Nonpartisan
Bill Summary · HJR 11

Summary — HJR 11: Change Anti‑Donation Clause (constitutional amendment)

Purpose / Intent

House Joint Resolution 11 (HJR11) proposes to repeal and replace Article IX, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution (the Anti‑Donation Clause). The amendment would allow public funds to be donated to private persons or entities when the transfer is used to accomplish a defined “public purpose,” broadening circumstances in which government can transfer money to private parties.

Key provisions

  • Replaces the current Anti‑Donation Clause with a general exception that permits donations of public funds to private persons or entities if used to accomplish a “public purpose.”
  • Defines “public purpose” as actions for the benefit of public health, safety, or welfare.
  • The amendment is not self‑executing: before donations may occur, the New Mexico Legislature must enact implementing legislation (majority vote of both chambers).
  • The amendment would go to voters and would become effective only if approved at the next general election (November 2026) or at a special election called for that purpose.
  • HJR11 is linked conceptually to companion enabling legislation (House Bill 290) discussed in analyses, which would create a DFA‑run program (the “Vibrant Communities Program”) to administer such donations.

Fiscal impact (summary of Legislative Finance analysis)

  • Ballot/printing costs for placing a constitutional amendment before voters: estimated $35,000–$50,000 (Secretary of State printing/publication obligations).
  • Administrative costs (estimated recurring, contingent on enabling legislation and program implementation): up to about $1.5 million to the Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) and up to about $1.0 million to the Office of the State Auditor (OSA) starting in FY27; combined total cited up to ~$1.55 million (includes nonrecurring SOS costs).
  • Capital outlay implications: by removing constitutional barriers, the amendment could increase capital appropriations directly to private nonprofits (privately owned facilities). LFC/DFA estimate current capital appropriations routed to nonprofits via public fiscal agents are no more than ~5% of local capital appropriations (~$26M annually based on recent levels). The fiscal note assumes, at most, a doubling of annual capital appropriations to nonprofits if voters approve — meaning an incremental shift of funds away from local, tribal governments and other public subdivisions beginning as early as FY28. The amendment would not change capital revenue sources (e.g., severance tax) but would change recipients.

Who would be affected

  • State agencies (DFA, OSA, Secretary of State), which would have administrative, oversight, and ballot‑publication duties.
  • Local and tribal governments and political subdivisions: potential reduction in discretionary capital outlay shares if more funds are directed to private entities.
  • Nonprofit and private entities that might receive public donations for projects serving “public purpose.”
  • Voters, because approval is required for the constitutional change.
  • Regulatory/oversight bodies (State Ethics Commission, Office of the State Auditor) — potential increased enforcement, audit, and workload.

Significant issues and legal/administrative concerns

  • The proposal broadens the exception to permit gifts/donations tied to broadly defined “public purpose,” but does not set detailed safeguards or criteria in the amendment itself. Critics (SEC, OSA analyses) note lack of prescriptive requirements for enabling legislation (unlike narrower prior exceptions such as affordable housing).
  • Unclear effect on counties and municipalities, especially differences between home‑rule and non‑home‑rule governments: the proposed amendment and companion enabling bill are not explicit about whether political subdivisions may independently make such donations.
  • Potential for increased transfers outside traditional contract frameworks and increased need for accountability, auditing, and oversight.
  • Legal opinions indicate many current narrow exceptions and common‑law doctrines likely would be subsumed or altered under the new language.

Procedural / timeline

  • As a constitutional amendment, HJR11 requires voter approval to take effect. The resolution specifies placement on the next general election ballot (Nov 2026) or a special election called for that purpose.
  • HJR11 is contingent on implementing legislation before actual donations could occur.
  • Committee history (New Mexico legislative analyses): HGEIC reported without recommendation and referred to Judiciary; fiscal and policy analyses date from early 2025. Current status provided: action postponed indefinitely.

Related legislation

  • House Bill 290 (companion/enabling legislation referenced in analyses), which would establish an administrative framework (DFA “Vibrant Communities Program”) for making donations to private entities.

Status: action postponed indefinitely (per provided legislative actions).

Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.

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