WeVote
Log In

Bill

Bill

S 4998

Fourth Amendment Restoration and Protection Act of 2026

119th Congress Introduced by Rand Paul

The bill would prohibit or severely limit surveillance of United States persons under FISA and EO 12333 and bar using that information in most criminal, civil, or administrative pr

Introduced in Senate
0
WeVote Research Nonpartisan
Bill Summary · S 4998

Summary of Bill: S. 4998 – Fourth Amendment Restoration and Protection Act of 2026

Purpose and Intent

  • Introduces a comprehensive set of amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) to restrict surveillance activities targeting United States persons and to prohibit the use of information obtained under FISA (and related executive orders) in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or investigation.
  • Title explicitly: “Fourth Amendment Restoration and Protection Act of 2026.”
  • Introduced in the Senate July 15, 2026 by Senator Rand Paul (with a listed sponsor) and referred to the Judiciary Committee.

Key Provisions and Changes

  1. New Title IX – Limitations on Authorities to Surveil United States Persons and on Use of Information

    • Added at the end of FISA as a new Title IX (Section 901).

  2. Definitions (Section 901(a))

    • Clarifies terms:
      • United States person: as defined in FISA.
      • Pen register and trap and trace device: as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3127.
      • Derived information: information or evidence obtained through an acquisition that the government would not have possessed otherwise, and which, regardless of attribution or later methods, would have been discovered or obtained eventually.

  3. Limitations on Authorized Activities (Section 901(b))

    • Prohibits the FISA Court and federal authorities from obtaining or approving:
      • Electronic surveillance of a United States person.
      • Physical searches of premises, information, material, or property exclusively used by or under the control of a United States person.
      • Installation and use of pen registers or trap-and-trace devices to obtain information concerning a United States person.
      • Production of tangible things (books, records, documents, etc.) concerning a United States person.
      • Targeting a United States person for acquisition of information.

  4. Limitations on Queries of Information Collected Under Section 702 (Section 901(c))

    • Prohibits querying information collected under Section 702(a) using search terms associated with a United States person.

  5. Limitations on Use of Information Concerning United States Persons (Section 901(d))

    • Defines “aggrieved person” as:
      • The target of surveillance under this Act or any other person whose communications or activities were subject to such surveillance.
    • General rule: Information concerning a United States person acquired or derived under this Act shall not be used as evidence against that person in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or investigation.
    • Exception: An aggrieved United States person may use the information in a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or investigation.

  6. Clerical Amendment (Table of Contents)

    • Adds a new entry: Title IX—Limitations on authorities to surveil United States persons and on use of information concerning United States persons.

  7. Executive Order 12333 Provisions (Section 901(b) Subsection (d))

    • Extends similar limitations to information acquired under Executive Order 12333 (which governs U.S. intelligence activities) and successor orders:
      • Defines “aggrieved person,” “pen register,” “trap and trace device,” and “United States person” consistent with FISA provisions.
      • Prohibits or restricts:
      • Acquisition of information by physical searches or through third parties, with authority limited to exclusive means when the target is a United States person.
      • Use of information concerning United States persons acquired under EO 12333 in criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings or investigations (with an exception for aggrieved persons).
      • Queries of communications content, non-content information, or business records of United States persons under EO 12333.
      • Allows an aggrieved United States person to use information obtained under EO 12333 in legal proceedings or investigations.

  8. Rule of Construction (Section 901(e))

    • Clarifies that nothing in this section or amendments should abrogate Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding Fourth Amendment warrant requirements, including exigent circumstances exceptions.

Who Would Be Affected

  • United States persons (and those whose communications or activities are linked to them) would face:
    • Prohibited or severely limited surveillance activities under FISA and EO 12333.
    • Restrictions on the use of information derived from such surveillance in criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings or investigations.
  • Government agencies and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) would be constrained in:
    • Seeking orders for surveillance, searches, pen registers, or procurement of tangible items involving U.S. persons.
    • Conducting certain queries of 702 information or EO 12333-derived information.
  • Aggrieved persons (as defined) would have enhanced ability to use information obtained under these authorities in legal proceedings (subject to limits).

Procedural and Timeline Aspects

  • The bill’s text indicates amendments would be added to the end of FISA as Title IX, and changes would take effect upon enactment (no specific sunset or transition dates provided in the text available).
  • Political timeline:
    • Introduced in the Senate on July 15, 2026.
    • Referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
  • Companion or House actions are not shown in the provided excerpt.

Potential Impacts and Considerations

  • Strengthens Fourth Amendment protections by narrowing the scope of surveillance targeting U.S. persons under FISA and EO 12333.
  • Significant change in:
    • Access to information about U.S. persons by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
    • Admissibility of information obtained under these authorities in legal proceedings.
  • Could raise questions about national security trade-offs, standards for evidence, and due process in investigations.
  • Courts and agencies would need to assess and adjust to new definitions, limitations, and potential evidentiary rules.

If you’d like, I can provide a side-by-side comparison with current FISA and EO 12333 provisions, or a quick impact assessment for specific agencies (e.g., NSA, FBI) under the bill’s framework.

Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.

Sign in to ask a question.