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SJR 9

Constitutional Officer Term Limit Amendment

2025 Regular Session Introduced by Mike Woelfel

Amends NM Constitution to create a permanent independent nine-member redistricting commission that draws and adopts state legislative maps after each census.

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Bill Summary · SJR 9

SJR 9 — Independent Redistricting Commission (New Mexico) — Summary

Status: Action postponed indefinitely
Introduced: June 18, 2025
Type: Joint resolution proposing a state constitutional amendment (requires voter approval)
Primary subject: Constitution of New Mexico / Legislature

Main purpose

SJR 9 would amend the New Mexico Constitution to (1) require automatic resignation of a legislator who permanently removes or maintains no residence in the district from which they were elected, and (2) establish a permanent, independent redistricting commission charged with developing and adopting state legislative and other state-office district plans following each federal decennial census.

Key provisions

  • Legislator residency: Amends Article IV, Section 3 to require automatic resignation when a senator or representative permanently leaves or has no residence in the district where elected; a successor would be elected as provided elsewhere in Article IV.
  • Independent Redistricting Commission:
    • Creation: A nine-member commission established by September 1 of every federal decennial census year.
    • Membership: 3 members from the largest political party, 3 from the second-largest party, and 3 unaffiliated members. Selection would use a combination of random selection and majority vote (further details to be specified).
    • Duties and timing: The commission must develop and adopt redistricting plans for state legislative and other state offices and file adopted plans with the Secretary of State within six months of the release of census data.
    • Mapping rules: Districts must follow traditional redistricting principles, avoid diluting minority voting strength (consistent with Voting Rights Act protections), and cannot use incumbents’ addresses, party membership, or voting history as mapping criteria except as necessary for compliance.
    • Authority and operations: The commission would have independent procurement authority, may hire staff and legal counsel, and would control its own legal representation in litigation challenging adopted plans.

Who is affected

  • State legislators (residency rule).
  • Voters and communities impacted by how legislative districts are drawn.
  • The existing Citizens’ Redistricting Committee (created by 2021 law) and the Legislature — SJR 9 would give final map-adoption authority to the constitutional commission, potentially superseding statutory roles.
  • State agencies (Secretary of State, Attorney General) for administrative and potential litigation-related functions.

Timeline & procedural notes

  • If adopted by the Legislature, the amendment must be placed on the ballot for voter approval — the fiscal note references the next general election (November 2026) or a special election called for that purpose.
  • The commission must be constituted by Sept. 1 of each census year and file maps within six months after census data are released.
  • The amendment only takes effect if approved by voters.

Fiscal impact (from Legislative Finance Committee)

  • Ballot/publication costs for a constitutional amendment: estimated $35,000–$50,000 (one-time).
  • Commission operational costs are nonrecurring and expected primarily in the census year (FY27 estimate): roughly $36,200–$52,500 (includes per diem for nine members and initial staffing/legal/technology costs). Ongoing costs would depend on implementation decisions and enabling legislation.

Significant issues / considerations

  • Overlap/conflict with the existing Citizens’ Redistricting Committee; enabling/statutory language will be needed to clarify roles and avoid duplication.
  • The Attorney General could represent the commission in litigation but funding and resource responsibilities are not specified in the resolution.
  • Technical drafting gaps noted (e.g., tie-breaking method for member selection; consequences and procedures for displaced incumbents when maps change) — enabling legislation and clearer selection rules are advisable.

This summary synthesizes the fiscal-analysis and bill text excerpts prepared for SJR 9.

Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.

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