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H 3399

Children's Default to Safety Act

2025-2026 Regular Session Introduced by Jeff Bradley and 5 co-sponsors

SC bill requires new smartphones/tablets activated in state to auto-enable a passcode-protected filter blocking content harmful to minors, with AG enforcement and private remedies.

Member(s) request name added as sponsor: Govan, Erickson, Bradley
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WeVote Research Nonpartisan
Bill Summary · H 3399

Summary — H 3399: "Children's Default to Safety Act" (with note on mixed document content)

Note: The provided bill file includes two distinct texts merged together: (A) a South Carolina “Children’s Default to Safety Act” (full substantive text) and (B) a short Massachusetts amendment to Chapter 30B requiring a 10% in‑state manufacturer procurement target. Below summarizes the primary (South Carolina) Children’s Default to Safety Act provisions and then briefly notes the separate Massachusetts procurement text and key procedural dates from the file.

Purpose / Intent

  • Establish a default safety setting on new smartphones and tablets activated in the state so devices automatically enable and passcode‑protect content filters that block material "harmful to minors."
  • Create civil and criminal liability for manufacturers and certain third parties who undermine or bypass those protections.
  • Enable state enforcement (Attorney General) and private lawsuits by parents/guardians.

Key definitions

  • Device: smartphone or tablet manufactured on or after January 1, 2026.
  • Filter: manufacturer‑installed software that can prevent access to material harmful to minors.
  • Harmful to minors: as defined by the state's existing statute (cross‑referenced).
  • Manufacturer: entity manufacturing the device or holding its patents and having a registered agent.
  • Minor: under 18, not emancipated/married/serving in armed forces.

Manufacturer requirements (effective January 1, 2026)

  • Devices activated in the state must automatically enable and passcode‑protect a filter that:
    • Prevents access/download of material harmful to minors over mobile data, wired/wireless internet, and manufacturer‑controlled apps;
    • Notifies users when blocking occurs;
    • Allows unblocking only with a passcode; and
    • Reasonably prevents non‑passcode users from deactivating/modifying/uninstalling the filter.

Enforcement and penalties

  • State Attorney General may seek injunctions, recover investigation costs and fees, and seek civil penalties up to $5,000 per violation (capped at $50,000 aggregate) and may pursue license revocation.
  • Each noncompliant device manufactured on/after Jan 1, 2026 may be treated as a separate violation for penalty calculations.
  • Manufacturers are shielded if they made a “good faith effort” to provide a generally accepted, commercially reasonable filtering method meeting industry standards.

Private rights & remedies

  • Parents/legal guardians may sue manufacturers for violations that allow minors to access pornographic content harmful to minors.
    • Remedies: actual damages or liquidated damages of $50,000 per violation (when actual damages are hard to ascertain), punitive damages for knowing/willful violations, attorney’s fees, and costs.
    • Class actions permitted where conduct is knowing and willful.
  • Parents/guardians may sue non‑parents who provide a passcode that results in a child’s exposure.

Criminal provisions

  • From Jan 1, 2026, it is a misdemeanor for anyone other than a parent/legal guardian to provide a passcode to remove the filter from a device in a minor’s possession.
    • Fines: up to $5,000 for first offense; up to $50,000 for second offense; repeat offenders may face up to 1 year jail.

Scope & Timeline

  • Applies to tablets and smartphones manufactured on or after January 1, 2026 and activated within the state.
  • Effective dates and cross‑references follow the state statutory framework cited in the bill.

Potential impacts

  • Manufacturers selling devices to residents in the state will need to implement default, passcode‑protected content filters and technical controls to prevent circumvention.
  • Could increase compliance costs for device makers and may spur litigation; parents gain a robust private remedy.
  • Raises questions about technical feasibility for filtering (especially third‑party apps and encrypted content), First Amendment/commerce clause implications, and interactions with platform/app ecosystems.

Separate Massachusetts procurement provision (short)

  • The file also contains language (House No. 3399, Rep. Norman J. Orrall) to amend Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 30B to require state agencies to procure a minimum of 10% of the contract value of products from businesses whose principal place of business is in the Commonwealth (per G.L. c. 23A §3A), with a waiver process. This is distinct from the Children’s Default to Safety Act and appears to be unrelated text included in the same docket.

Legislative status / procedural notes (from file)

  • Prefiled: 2024‑12‑05; Introduced and first read: 2025‑01‑14; Referred to Committee on Judiciary 2025‑01‑14.
  • Member(s) added as sponsors: Govan, Erickson, Bradley (2025‑02‑04).
  • Referred to State Administration and Regulatory Oversight (2025‑02‑27); Senate concurred (2025‑02‑27).
  • Hearing scheduled: 07/15/2025, 1:00–5:00 PM (B‑1).

If you want, I can: (a) produce a side‑by‑side comparison of this bill’s major enforcement provisions with other state "default safety" proposals; (b) draft a one‑page fact sheet for stakeholders (manufacturers, parents, AG office); or (c) extract likely constitutional/technical legal issues for further analysis.

Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.

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