Bill
SB 1123
Arizona SB 1123 would require ballot paper to meet certified anti-fraud security features and vendor certifications (ISO) for ballot procurement.
Status snapshot
- Introduced: February 6, 2025 (Arizona Senate, 57th Legislature).
- Legislative history in the provided document is inconsistent and appears to combine material from multiple states. The Arizona text shows the bill passed the Legislature and was transmitted to the Governor (April 16, 2025); the document also records a veto dated April 18, 2025. Verify current status with the official Arizona legislative website for an authoritative update.
Purpose and intent
- To change statutory requirements for paper used as election ballots by repealing existing Arizona Revised Statutes §16‑504 and adding a new §16‑504 that mandates vendor certifications and specified physical/technical anti‑fraud security measures embedded in ballot paper.
Key provisions
- Repeal: Section 16‑504, Arizona Revised Statutes, is repealed and replaced.
- Vendor certification: Any vendor that provides fraud countermeasures contained in or on ballot paper must hold one of the following certifications:
- ISO 27001, or
- ISO 17025, or
- ISO 9001:2015.
- Required antifraud measures: Ballot paper must include at least three of the following ten security features:
1. Unique, controlled‑supply watermarked bank‑specification security paper.
2. Secure holographic foil (visual deterrent / anti‑copy).
3. Branded overprint personalizing a hologram with customer logo.
4. Custom complex security background designs (banknote‑level).
5. Secure variable digital infill.
6. Thermochromic / photochromic / optically variable inks.
7. Stealth numbering in UV, IR or taggant inks.
8. Multicolored micro‑numismatic invisible UV designs.
9. Unique forensic fraud detection tech built into security inks.
10. Unique barcode or QR code accessible only to the voter that tracks the voter’s ballot as it is processed.
Who would be affected
- Ballot paper suppliers and printers (must meet specified ISO certification and implement security features).
- County and state election officials responsible for procurement, ballot design and chain‑of‑custody procedures.
- Voters indirectly could be affected through potential changes in ballot handling, costs, or privacy implications (notably the tracking barcode/QR feature).
- Vendors who currently supply ballots but lack the specified certifications may be excluded from contracts.
Potential impacts and considerations
- Cost: Enhanced security paper and certification requirements likely increase costs for ballot procurement.
- Supply: Narrowing of eligible vendors could affect supply availability and procurement timelines.
- Privacy and secrecy concerns: The provision permitting a “unique barcode or QR code… accessible only to the voter and that tracks the voter’s ballot” raises issues about ballot secrecy, anonymity, and compliance with state and federal legal protections for secret ballots; implementation would require careful design to avoid linking votes to individual identities.
- Implementation: Election officials would need rules/guidance on which combinations of features qualify, how to verify vendor certifications, and how to integrate security features with ballot tabulation systems.
- Legal/regulatory: The statute includes a “notwithstanding any other statute” clause, signaling preemption of conflicting provisions; interactions with existing election law and procurement law should be reviewed.
Notes on the document
- The provided file appears to conflate different legislative documents (Arizona and Illinois SB1123 language and varied committee actions). This summary focuses on the Arizona ballot‑security language (new §16‑504). Verify final text and current status from the Arizona Legislature’s official records.
Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.
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