SECURE Grid Act

Summary of Bill: S.4166 – SECURE Grid Act (119th Congress)

Purpose and intent

• The SECURE Grid Act aims to strengthen the security, resilience, and reliability of the U.S. electric grid by ensuring state energy security plans explicitly address the security of local distribution systems (LDS) and related supply chains.
• It amends the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) to expand planning requirements at the state level and to require consideration of physical security, cybersecurity, and resilience across energy sectors, including equipment supply.

Key provisions and changes

• Definition expansion: Local Distribution System

  • Adds a new definition: “local distribution system” means energy infrastructure owned and operated by an electric utility at 100 kilovolts (kV) or less.
  • This explicitly brings smaller-scale distribution assets into their planning and risk assessment scope.

• Scope of energy security plans (State energy security plans)

  • States must consider protecting the security of local distribution systems, in addition to generation and transmission, when developing and updating State energy security plans.

• Risk assessment and mitigation requirements

  • Replaces existing or adds to the risk framework with a focus on:
  • Physical threats and vulnerabilities (weather events, physical attacks on LDS and the bulk-power system, and supply chain risks for generation, transmission, and distribution equipment).
  • Cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities that could impact LDS and potentially affect the bulk-power system.
  • Requires plans to include a risk mitigation approach to enhance reliability and end-use resilience, detailing methods to respond to, mitigate, and recover from identified hazards.

• Coordination and equipment supply considerations

  • Expands authorities to consider equipment supply for generation, transmission, and distribution in planning and mitigation strategies.
  • Clarifies inclusion of equipment suppliers in the planning and risk framework.

• State submission and federal oversight

  • Requires a more explicit process for state plan submissions and potential federal involvement, including a mandate that a State submission under specified paragraphs is not required to be approved by the Secretary (new phrasing in the bill).

• Mandatory timing and expiration

  • Subsection changes make certain provisions mandatory (e.g., “shall” instead of “may” in related provisions).
  • The section on “UNSET” (Section 366(i)) is replaced with an explicit expiration: the energy security section would expire on September 30, 2031, unless extended or amended.

• GAO reporting and evaluation (Section 3)

  • Requires a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report due by September 30, 2030 assessing:
  • How state energy security plans have improved risk identification, assessment, mitigation, and resilience.
  • Recommendations to improve state capabilities and federal coordination with states.
  • Use and effectiveness of Federal financial assistance under related EPCA provisions in implementing these plans.
  • Activities states have undertaken with that assistance and revisions to state energy security plans resulting from the assistance.
  • An analysis of the overall effectiveness of the reorganized framework (as amended by this Act) and state use of additional assistance, including section 366(f) authority.

• Protected information handling

  • Reports to Congress may be public, but information protected from disclosure under existing confidentiality provisions remains shielded and included in an annex.

Who and what would be affected

• Primary beneficiaries and affected entities:
  • States and state energy offices, which would need to incorporate LDS security, resilience, and supply-chain considerations into their energy security planning.
  • Electric utilities and their LDS assets (including distribution networks at or below 100 kV), which would be explicitly considered in risk assessments and mitigation planning.
  • Equipment suppliers and manufacturers involved in generation, transmission, and distribution, due to inclusion of supply-chain risk and equipment considerations in planning.
  • The broader public, through improved resilience of local electricity service and reduced vulnerability to hazards.

Procedural and timeline aspects

• Effective date and expiration: The act would set an expiration for the expanded section on September 30, 2031, after which it could be reviewed, renewed, or amended.
• Reporting timeline: GAO analysis and reports are due by September 30, 2030, evaluating the effectiveness and implementation of state energy security plans under the amended framework.
• Oversight and compliance: The bill alters submission and approval dynamics (notably allowing state submissions to proceed without mandatory Secretary approval for certain provisions), shifting how federal review interacts with state plans.

Overall impact

• The SECURE Grid Act codifies a more comprehensive, grid-wide approach to security, emphasizing local distribution systems and their interdependencies with the bulk-power system.
• It elevates physical and cyber threat assessment, resilience planning, and supply-chain risk in state-level energy security planning.
• It introduces explicit federal evaluation and coordination mechanisms (GAO reporting) to measure effectiveness and guide future enhancements.