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S 42

Insurance coverage for lactation services and doula services

2025-2026 Regular Session Introduced by Tom Davis and 2 co-sponsors

Prohibits state and local governments in Massachusetts from paying or communicating with ransomware attackers and requires reporting to the CIO after a ransom demand.

Referred to Committee on Banking and Insurance
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WeVote Research Nonpartisan
Bill Summary · S 42

Summary — S.42 (Senate Docket No. 2020) — "An Act protecting against cyber ransom"

Note: the materials provided contain conflicting metadata (a different short title about nurse aides and a sponsors list that appears to be federal). This summary focuses on the bill text included in the docket (Massachusetts Senate Docket No. 42, introduced Jan. 2025 by Senator Paul W. Mark), which would amend Chapter 7D of the Massachusetts General Laws to restrict payments and communications with ransomware actors.

Main purpose

To prohibit Commonwealth and local government entities in Massachusetts from paying ransoms or communicating with actors who have encrypted government data and are demanding payment, and to require reporting and consultation with the Commonwealth’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) when a ransom demand is received.

Key provisions

  • Amends Chapter 7D, Section 7 of the Massachusetts General Laws by adding two subsections:
    • (e) Prohibits any state agency, local government entity, or municipality from submitting payment or otherwise communicating with an entity that has carried out a cybersecurity incident involving encryption of data and later offers to decrypt that data in exchange for a ransom payment.
    • (f) Requires any state agency or local government entity that receives a ransom request in connection with a cybersecurity incident to report the incident to, and consult with, the CIO.

Who is affected

  • All Massachusetts state agencies.
  • Local government entities and municipalities within Massachusetts.
  • Indirectly affects contractors, incident response vendors, cyber insurance providers, and law enforcement partners who currently assist governments in responding to ransomware incidents.

Implementation and procedural notes

  • Bill text filed in the 194th General Court (2025–2026).
  • Introduced/Filed: January 2025 (Senate docket filings show Jan. 9 and Jan. 17, 2025).
  • Committee activity in the provided record includes referrals to committees concerning finance and advanced information technology/cybersecurity and at least one scheduled hearing (noted July 10, 2025). Status entries in the supplied materials are inconsistent (multiple “referred” entries to Higher Education, Committee on Finance, and Advanced Information Technology), indicating mixed metadata.
  • The statute would become effective when enacted according to the normal legislative process; no effective date or phased implementation is stated in the text excerpt.

Practical implications and issues to consider

  • The ban on “submitting payment or otherwise communicating” with ransom actors is broad and could limit:
    • Negotiations or communications carried out by law enforcement or designated incident response teams.
    • Use of external negotiators or insurers that historically interact with attackers.
  • The requirement to report to and consult with the CIO centralizes incident coordination, which may aid consistency and leverage statewide resources but will require adequate CIO capacity and clear operational protocols.
  • The bill text as provided does not specify penalties, exceptions (e.g., where law enforcement advises otherwise), or detailed reporting/consultation procedures — these implementation details would need clarification in rulemaking or follow-up legislation.
  • Potential trade-offs: discouraging ransom payments can reduce incentives for attackers, but it may increase immediate operational costs and data recovery complexity for affected entities.

Additional note on provided materials

  • The initial header (title about nurse aides administering medication in St. Lawrence County), the sponsors list (several federal senators), and some legislative-action metadata appear inconsistent with the Massachusetts bill text. Those discrepancies suggest either a merged/incorrect metadata set or multiple bills referenced; the analysis above is based solely on the Massachusetts bill text titled “An Act protecting against cyber ransom.”

Compiled from official sources — confirm details with the bill’s official record.

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